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I 
In the last few years the neo-Malthusian assumption that intensive (per caput) growth 
in ' traditional' societies was virtually non-existent, has been challenged from two 
directions. On the one hand, it is now clear that neo-Malthusianism focussed 
disproportionately on the agricultural sector, particularly on the production of food 
grains. The effect was to seriously underestimate significant instances of growth in the 
non-grain agricultural, service and manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, we are 
now aware that pre-industrial agrarian technology was capable of far higher levels of 
output than was previously believed. This discovery directly challenges the neo-
Malthusian tenet that pre-modem societies were operating at or close to their 
technological frontier, and that this set insuperable constraints on available food 
supplies. 
The recent turn towards greater technological optimism has some additional important 
implications. First, it answers the neo-Malthusian conundrum why, if pre-modern 
societies made optimal use of technology which remained basically static between the 
thirteenth and late eighteenth centuries, the demographic 'ceiling' nonetheless kept 
shifting upwards through much of the period. The simple answer is that throughout 
much of Europe, the technological frontier had not been reached by the thirteenth or 
even the early eighteenth centuries. The history of pre-modem European agriculture 
appears to be largely a story of technical diffusion from a handful of advanced regions. 
Second, if most pre-modem societies were not operating at the height of their 
technological capacity, the heretofore excluded possibility of intensive pre-modem 
growth (rising per caput welfare) becomes feasible. Third, it is clear that pre-modem 
technological capacity was fully exploited only episodically and in relatively few 
European regions (Alien 1995; Overton 1996; Hoffinan 1996; De Vries and van der 
Woude 1997). This points us to the new question at the heart of the emerging 
consensus about pre-modem agricultural growth. Where neo-Malthusian scholars 
were happy to tar all pre-industrial economies with the same brush of stagnation (with 
England as an unexplained exception to the rule), proponents of pre-modem growth 
are faced with describing and explaining far greater regional economic diversity and 
divergence. 
Recent developments also suggest new answers to the old debate on the late medieval 
' crisis' and the transition to capitalism. Ibis paper addresses the issue in three parts. 
Firstly, I discuss current models of the 'feudal' economy, all of which appeal to 
exogenous sources of change, and propose an alternative model of endogenous 
development in which long-run intensive growth is one of a range of alternative 
outcomes or multiple equilibria. Secondly, I address the nature and causes of the 
demographic slowdown that took place in many parts of western Europe from the late 
thirteenth century. Was it a systemic crisis, as neo-Malthusians and neo-Marxists 
claim, or was it instead a series of short-term difficulties that could have been 
overcome had the catastrophe of the Black Death not struck, as recent commentators 
imply? In other words, have claims about a ' general crisis' been based on post hoc 
ergo propter hoc arguments? Lastly, I outline a model of the outcome of the crisis that 
emphasises its endogenous rather than exogenous nature, and I suggest an answer to 
the question why long-run intensive growth in early modem Europe seems to have 
been so rhapsodic across time and space. 
IT 
Current understanding of conditions before the Black Death is defmed by neo-
Malthusian and neo-Marxist parameters. Both models claim that from the turn of the 
fourteenth century a general, systemic crisis was under way, which caused a significant 
decline in average standards of living signalled by rising mortality and a slowing down 
or reversal of demographic growth. Although neo-Malthusians focus on the increasing 
imbalance between population and resources and neo-Marxists emphasise the role of 
feudal appropriation of peasant surplus, they both assume that the feudal economy was 
incapable of significant technological innovation and are therefore pessimistic about 
medieval society's capacity to overcome bottlenecks in production. Technological 
stagnation was a consequence of the prevailing incentive structure. Feudal lords, 
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whose income was obtained through military and legal (,extra-economic') coercion, 
had few incentives to produce for, and compete in, the market. Conversely, the lack of 
competitive markets gave them little incentive for innovation. Lastly the lack of 
transparent, efficient markets compounded the peasantry's natural risk aversion and 
made them prefer self-sufficiency to ' dependence' on trade. 
In this picture, feudalism was a one-good Ricardian economy producing grain, in 
which no alternative agricultural or manufacturing activities were available (Desai 
1991). Economic growth could only be achieved extensively by bringing new land 
into cultivation, but this source of growth ran up against rapidly diminishing returns, as 
the land's embodied fertility could not be reconstituted because of the lack of capital 
and primitive technology. In the long nm, the effects of declining productivity on per 
caput food consumption were magnified by the lords ' attempt to maintain or increase 
their share of the social surplus in response to inflationary military expenditure. The 
Black Death struck a society that was already physiologically and socially debilitated. 
It cast a starker beam over the society's inherent weaknesses, but it was not their cause. 
Recent criticisms of the model have addressed four factors: first, the forces which 
regulated patterns of demographic growth; second, the technological capabilities of 
peasant agriculture; third, the sectoral composition of the rural economy; and fourth, 
the nature of markets under feudalism. 
1. The neo-Malthusian argument about the increasing imbalance between 
population and resources around 1300 arose from three distinct claims: that the 
marginal productivity of land was in long nm decline; that lower levels of food 
consumption, and particularly the greater incidence of harvest crises, sharply increased 
levels of background and crisis mortality and reversed previous population growth; and 
that medieval societies were incapable of applying preventive checks to nuptiality and 
natality that could mitigate the pressure on resources. None of these claims has 
withstood closer scrutiny. 
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The data on Winchester yields used by Postan and Titow to demonstrate a decline in 
agricultural output from the late thirteenth century are in fact inconclusive (postan & 
Titow 1958-9; Desai 1991), and recent findings for other parts of England and 
Continental Europe suggest that average yields in some regions at this time were still 
increasing. A neo-Malthusian explanation is equally hard to square with evidence of 
considerable variation in patterns of demographic change in different parts of Western 
Europe. English historians have documented significant demographic divergence 
between regions and even between neighbouring communities (Harvey 1991; Smith 
1991); similar regional differences are well attested for Iberia, Italy and France. 
The claim that levels and instances of background and crisis mortality increased from 
the late thirteenth century is also problematic. In the first place, the positive 
correlation between heriots and grain prices, which Postan and Titow took as evidence 
of crisis mortality, is better viewed as a measure of distress sales of land in response to 
a failure in market entitlements (Harvey 1991; Smith 1991). Second, a growing body 
of epidemiological and economic research has cast doubt on the postulated link 
between food intake or direct entitlement failure and crisis mortality. Short-term 
mortality crises seem to have been far more a function of the social disruption and 
increased mobility of populations at risk that was associated with inefficient systems of 
distribution and unbalanced entitlements (Sen 1981; Ravaillon 1987; Cotts Watkins 
and Menken 1985; Livi Bacci 1990; Waiter and Schofield 1989). Third, there are 
reasons to doubt that the price volatility of grain reflects harvest output (see e.g. 
Labrousse 1933), rather than expectations about supply that in turn are a function of 
transactions costs. In the latter case, price volatility should be taken as a measure of 
efficiency in distributing current and past stocks of food, and increases in volatility 
reflect rising uncertainty and barriers to trade (Fogel 1992; Persson 1996; Nielssen 
1997; Epstein 1998d). 
The neo-Malthusian synthesis assumes that medieval peasants were incapable of 
adapting their reproductive strategy to changing economic circumstances, in the short 
term because they lacked the knowledge of basic contraceptive and abortifacient 
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techniques, and in the longer term because they were incapable of calibrating levels of 
nuptiality to the availability of economic opportunities. Against this, however, there is 
evidence that both contraceptives and abortifacients were well known by the thirteenth 
century (when the relevant sources become more numerous), and that they were 
deliberately used -- particularly by the poorer sections of the population - to reduce 
birth rates (Biller 1980).1 The well-known positive correlation between peasant 
wealth and family size further supports the view that voluntary forms of birth control, 
including the longer term ' West European' strategy of delaying the age of first 
marriage, were commonly practised in medieval western Europe (Razi 1980; Herlihy 
1982; Leverotti 1989)? 
2. The particular difficulties with measuring productivity in cereal production and 
the past reliance on crude measures of yield per unit of seed has helped perpetuate a 
conservative view of the feudal economy. Recent improvements in methods of 
measurement have substantially raised earlier estimates of pre-modern agricultural 
productivity, and have suggested that population density was positively rather than 
negatively correlated with agricultural productivity (see Boserup 1965). As might be 
expected given the high cost of transporting bulk foods, the highest densities in rural 
population were found in regions like north-central Italy, Flanders, Ile-de-France, 
Artois, and Norfolk that also displayed the highest rates of medieval agricultural 
productivity. 
It has also become clear that the absence of significant new technological hardware 
(machines and crops) between the thirteenth and the eighteenth century was less of a 
1 Evidence of preventive checks among the peasantry is clearly far from conclusive. 
However, if we are to take seriously the claim that they were responding in 
economically rational ways to price signals, we must also assume that they would 
have been aware of the consequences of excess natality . 
2 Whereas it is possible that the correlation reflects the lower probability of child 
survival in poorer families owing to malnutrition, worse heating and lodging 
conditions etc., poor peasants could have overcome this disadvantage by increasing 
their crude birth rate. 
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constraint on agricultural productivity than had been believed. Substantial productivity 
gains could be made through simple organisational changes in production, on the basis 
of practical knowledge that was available from at least the thirteenth century. Thus, by 
the 1320s Norfolk peasants had achieved levels of land productivity that were only 
achieved again by the eighteenth century (Campbell & Overton 1993). In thirteenth-
century Tuscany, average agricultural productivity may have increased about 0.25 per 
cent per annum without much evidence of major technological improvements; this 
level, which is comparable to early modem data, was associated with a rough doubling 
of the total population and a tripling of the proportion of urban inhabitants. Alain 
Derville, Eric Thoen and others have identified similar perfonnances for Artois and 
Flanders. For the early modem period (when the prevailing technology was still by 
and large unchanged), Robert Allen has suggested that the introduction by early 
modem peasant landowners of small-scale improvements to drainage in the heavy 
Midland clays fuelled a 'yeoman' revolution in agricultural productivity; Philip 
Hoffinan has documented comparable patterns of growth in central and northern 
France; and George Grantham has estimated that pre-modern levels of urbanisation 
were generally far lower than the land's carrying capacity at prevailing technologies 
allowed (persson 1991; Derville 1987; Thoen **; Allen 1995; Hoffinann 1996; 
Grantham 1993 and 1997). 
The most critical determining factor in the peasants' decision to innovate was the 
opportunity cost of trade defined by the prevailing transaction costs. Thus, for 
example, English smallholders who faced higher average rents than large peasants, 
substituted horses for oxen more rapidly than large-scale tenant farmers and feudal 
landlords. The need for a higher proportion of total income in cash led them to engage 
heavily in short-range trading activities, for which faster horse transport constituted a 
clear advantage (Langdon 1986). Conversely, periodic setbacks in pre-modern 
agricultural productivity seem to have occurred because of sharp increases in the cost 
of trade, mainly due to warfare. By implication, the significant reduction in 
transactions costs during the later Middle Ages, to be discussed below, must have 
lowered the risk threshold of agricultural innovation and raised the potential gains from 
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innovation. 
3. The view of the feudal economy as a one good economy put forward by Le Roy 
Ladurie (1966), Postan (1973), Bois (1984) and Brenner (1985) ignores the substantial 
occupational alternatives for rural producers. These included wool production (which 
accounted for up to a third of rural GNP in early fourteenth-century England), 
Mediterranean tree crops, livestock meat, dairy and leather production, and most 
crucially, various forms of by-employment or 'Z-goods' in the manufacturing and 
service sectors (Hymer & Resnick 1969). The old, simplified model therefore also 
overestimated the welfare effects of harvest crises in the decades before the Black 
Death because it took no account of other activities that raised disposable incomes and 
stimulated agrarian specialisation. Increases in rural by-employment in some regions 
during the half to three-quarter century before the Black Death imply, contrary to 
received wisdom, that the relative price of basic foods compared to manufactures was 
either stable or declining. On the other hand, an over-simple economic model caused 
the economic improvements and diversification after the Black Death to be 
underestimated. 
4. Although the fact that product markets (and to a lesser extent land, labour and 
credit markets) were ubiquitous had long been known about the more urbanised and 
less overtly feudal regions of Europe such as Flanders, parts of Iberia, southern France 
and Italy, similar patterns are now also been established for less developed countries 
like England. Miller's and Hatcher's recent overview describes the period c.1086 to 
1348 as one of rising commercialisation, during which England's rate of urbanisation 
tripled and per caput circulating coinage grew perhaps tenfold (Miller & Hatcher 1995; 
see also Britnell 1993). This was not a society that could only expand through 
colonisation and was unable to raise living standards substantially. Intensive growth 
was clearly being achieved. 
* * * * * 
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In sum, post-war economic models underestimated the productive potential and the 
actual perfonnance of medieval and early modem agriculture. Agrarian practices that 
had been developed for the most part before the mid-fourteenth century crisis could 
raise output and productivity considerably above the demographic' ceiling' reached 
around 1300 and again towards 1650. Many of these gains had still to be exhausted by 
the eighteenth century. The major influence on the rate of innovation was the cost of 
trade broadly defined. Ease of access to structured and competitive markets was a 
prerequisite for growth. Both neo-Malthusians and neo-Marxists underestimated the 
capacity of medieval and afortiori early modem populations to limit birth rates in 
response to economic pressure. The available evidence suggests that medieval 
societies regulated their size in tenns of economic opportunities, and that the main 
reason why their technological potential was not fully exploited before the Black Death 
was for lack of adequate incentives. In most cases, the opportunity costs of innovation 
were simply too high. 
These conclusions appear to follow in the tracks of recent ' commercialisation' or neo-
Smithian revisionism, which has been particularly active among Anglo-American 
medievalists. This group of scholars tends to maximise the cumulative impact of 
commercial change, to suggest that welfare levels were not severely eroded by 1300, 
and to imply that the early fourteenth-century mortality crises were temporary and 
reversible setbacks (Bailey 1998). However, the commercialisation thesis has two 
weaknesses. First, the assumption that medieval peasants behaved like modem Kansas 
farmers loses sight of the historically contingent features of pre-modem economies; in 
other words, it tells us nothing about how incentive structures changed over time. 
Second, a strictly Smithian model of growth sidesteps the question why some areas 
were more commercialised and technologically advanced than others. It is perhaps 
significant that attempts to address these differences within the ' commercialisation' 
framework appeal to institutional factors like the extent of seigniorial control over 
trade that are exogenous to trade in itself (Campbell and Overton 1993). The 
commercialisation model describes growth; it does not explain it. The recent 
refonnulation ofPirenne' s thesis that growth was driven by urbanisation and access to 
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water transport (Grantham 1997) raises the question of what drove urbanisation in the 
first place. There are enough examples of successful towns that did not have direct 
access to water transport and conversely of coastal areas that did not develop strong 
commercial emporia, to suggest that the simple opportunity for engaging in trade was 
hardly enough to determine its emergence and success. 
ill 
A coherent model of the feudal economy must incorporate the recent fmdings I have 
just summarised; it must avoid the tautological appeal to trade as a source of trade; and 
it must be capable of explaining parsimoniously different regional growth rates. Here I 
briefly sketch what this model might look like. 
In the feudal or tributary mode of production, most rural producers owned their means 
of production and sold a proportion of their produce on the market. 3 Surplus 
extraction was based upon a decentralised system of legal compulsion backed by the 
threat of military coercion. Feudal income came directly through rent (in cash, kind or 
labour) and indirectly by means of levies on trade and on the provision of justice. 
Although the relative share of income from each source varied across time and space, 
the share from rights of jurisdiction (including compulsory labour services) was always 
substantial. Therefore, the principal threat to feudalism did not come from trade; up to 
a point feudalism thrived on trade.4 The principal obstacle to growth in the feudal 
3 The defmition of the peasantry as a class producing jointly for subsistence and for 
the market is preferable to essentially arbitrary definitions based on farm size, tenurial 
relations, imputed behavioural patterns etc. 
4 The main long-term threats to the feudal mode of surplus extraction lay elsewhere. 
Firstly, the development of a class of wage labourers that was no longer tied to its 
means of production undermined feudal coercion because it could credibly threaten 
to migrate, and forced lords to compete on the market for labour rather than rely on 
compulsory labour services. Second, state centralisation - the transfer of 
sovereignty over feudal means of coercion from subordinate lords to higher 
territorial authorities - transformed feudal rights of jurisdiction (which sanctioned 
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economy was the cost of trade, which was defined mainly by institutional factors and 
to a lesser extent by developments in transport technology. Feudalism did not exclude 
markets; it regulated them. Within the boundaries of a lord' s or city's jurisdiction, 
markets were by and large competitive; up to a point, therefore, feudal decentralisation 
could support both extensive and intensive growth.s However, the lords' and towns' 
main purpose in stimulating trade was to maximise the rent streams from their rights of 
jurisdiction. Consequently, agricultural innovation was generally inversely correlated 
with the intensity of seigniorial jurisdiction (Overton 1996), and rural industrial growth 
was inversely correlated with the jurisdictional powers of towns (Epstein 1999). 
In the absence of any countervailing forces, the tendency to raise jurisdictional barriers 
to trade would clearly have driven the feudal economy to a low level or sub-optimal 
equilibrium. That is indeed what occurred to the Polish Commonwealth after the 
collapse of the state in the seventeenth century. Elsewhere, the equilibrium was 
broken by what turned out to be the more powerful drive towards territorial integration, 
which was the second principal source of revenue for feudal lords. The purpose of 
feudal expansion was to expand the lord's political and fiscal base by subejcting and 
integrating the conquered lands to his jurisdiction. Jurisdictional integration (Olson 
1982) lowered transactions costs by reducing pre-existing seigniorial dues, by 
overcoming co-ordination failures (prisoner's dilemmas) between rival feudal and 
urban monopolies, by systematising legal codes, weights and measures, and by 
the decentralised feudal mode of coercion) into fiscal rights over commercial 
transactions (which sanctioned the state's jurisdiction over trade). The 
transformation of decentralised ' ownership' of feudal rights into state-sanctioned and 
redeemable claims to fiscal rights changed the legal base of the feudal class into a 
commodity that could be bought and sold to the highest bidder. Financial capital 
rather than social status became the former feudal lord's new coin of exchange. For 
the state, the issue whether to sell these income streams to the highest bidder or to 
get rid of them altogether was increasingly based on a primarily fmancial (fiscal) 
rather than a political calculus. 
S Capitalism is defined as a system in which the majority of producers work for a 
wage, which is set competitively through markets, and the owners of capital stock 
compete on the market for profits based on marginal cost rather than for politically 
sanctioned redistribution. On this defmition, the economy of pre-modern Europe at 
least up to the seventeenth century was largely feudal-tributary and not capitalist. 
10 
increasing the ruler's responsiveness to political pressure and reducing his incentives 
to act autocratically as a 'stationary bandit'. 
State formation was therefore a major cause of market integration and Smithian 
growth. Economic change in the system was the result of two opposite forces, the one 
pressing for military and jurisdictional decentralisation, the other pushing for increased 
political and jurisdictional centralisation. In the long run, feudal military competition 
and political centralisation won out, lowering transactions costs and stimulating 
commercialisation and specialisation. The 'prime mover' and 'contradiction' within the 
feudal mode of production lay in the relations between lords, peasants and the market 
(Abrams 1978). 
IV 
If one accepts that population growth provides a crude measure of economic growth, as 
recent reappraisals imply, the evidence of an economic slowdown in many parts of 
early fourteenth-century western Europe are hard to gainsay. The disagreements arise 
over its causes. Was the demographic turn the result of positive or of preventive 
checks? And if the latter, what caused the late thirteenth-century economy to slow 
down? 
It was pointed out previously that evidence for positive checks (namely a decline in 
food availability that raised average background mortality) is tenuous, and that neither 
the demographic slowdown nor the increasing incidence of famines prove that the 
population was outstripping available resources (Abel 1980). Evidence of increased 
price volatility of cereals, of socially unequal exposure to famine, and of highly 
variable and localised patterns of demographic change, are arguably better explained as 
the effect of growing institutional bottlenecks to specialisation through trade, 
bottlenecks whose strength and effects varied between localities and regions. In areas 
where opportunities for agricultural intensification and specialisation were being 
foreclosed and the costs of transporting grain to meet local shortages rose, the 
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incidence of famines and price volatility increased (Bailey 1998) and decisions to 
marry and procreate were deferred. Arguably the economic slowdown was due 
neither to primitive technology or to peasant conservatism, but to rising competition 
between feudal lords - including towns that possessed significant jurisdictional rights 
over the countryside, as in parts of Italy, Flanders and possibly Catalonia - for the 
profits of trade, for stable food supplies, and for territorial enlargement. The slow 
build-up of seigniorial and urban levies during the thirteenth century, and the increased 
incidence of feudal and inter-urban warfare from the 1290s onwards, reduced 
incentives for agricultural innovation by lowering the rate of return and by raising the 
risk threshold of specialisation. Where and when an economic slowdown did occur, it 
was arguably less a technologically determined 'agrarian crisis' than an institutionally 
induced 'crisis of distribution'. 
Despite considerable disagreements about the effects ofthe ' crisis' and of the pandemic 
shock caused by the Black Death, most historians agree that it brought about a decisive 
move towards capitalism6• For Brenner (1985), ' agrarian' capitalism could only 
develop after the self-sufficient peasantry had been expelled from the land, but this 
occurred only in England; elsewhere, the ' crisis' actually reinforced the feudal mode of 
production based on an independent peasantry or on serfdom. For Wallerstein (1974) 
and, more ambiguously, for Braudel (1982) the crisis instead triggered a more diffuse 
transition to merchant capitalism and to a 'capitalist world system' with western 
Europe at its core. These interpretations presuppose that the 'transition' to capitalism 
was set in motion by factors external to feudalism itself - as indeed follows logically 
from the assumption that feudalism possessed no internal growth dynamic. For 
Brenner, the deus ex machina was the balance of class power determined by 
historically contingent national characteristics; for Braudel and Wallerstein, the 
overseas discoveries provided the requisite external markets to pull the medieval 
economy out of stagnation. The most frequently heard answer to Maurice Dobb's old 
question whether there was a 'prime mover within feudalism bringing about the 
, The views of Le Roy Ladurie (1966), who observes no fundamental, structural 
difference between the economy of 1250 and that of 1550, are in a clear minority. 
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transition to the capitalist mode of production', is a clear and resounding 'no' (Dobb 
1946). 
In contrast with these views, it was argued previously that economic dynamism under 
feudalism was the outcome of two endogenous forces, market production and political 
centralisation. The argument must now be tested against the long-term consequences 
of the 'crisis' and the Black Death. It is of course clear from the preceding argument 
that the Black Death did not create dynamism and change where none existed before. 
Even in the absence of the bubonic plague of 1347-50, powerful political and 
economic forces that had been building up during the thirteenth century were pressing 
for major political and jurisdictional simplification: the two Hundred Years wars 
(between England and France and between Catalonia-Aragon, Sicily and Naples) are 
merely their most salient manifestations. Even without the shock of the plague, inbuilt 
pressures for political centralisation would, in the long run, have lowered transaction 
costs and improved incentives for trade and specialisation, slowly raising the economy 
to a higher growth path. 
The fourteenth-century pandemic accelerated this process of Schumpeterian 'creative 
destruction', by undermining the powers of lords and greater towns and by facilitating 
the development of more powerful states. Supported by social groups whose 
bargaining powers were strengthened by the shortage of labour and which stood to 
gain from lower feudal levies and weaker jurisdictional monopolies, aspiring rulers 
increased the jurisdictional integration of their territories and began incorporating new 
ones, made markets more competitive, stimulated commercialisation and set the stage 
for the long sixteenth-century boom. However, the degree and effectiveness of 
jurisdictional integration were influenced by institutional and political differences 
between states, which also established the framework for further integration. Insofar 
as jurisdictional integration defined the basic incentive structures within a region, the 
late medieval crisis both caused greater integration within politically bounded regions 
and defmed the institutional parameters for subsequent economic divergence between 
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• 7 regIOns. 
Much of the debate on the economy of the later Middle Ages has centred on the 
demand side, specifically on the extent to which shifts in bargaining power improved 
the average standard of living of the poorer peasants and wage-earners. It is generally 
agreed that individual welfare increased, although the degree of improvement and 
patterns of consumption differed between regions8• Rising consumption is well 
attested for meat, cheese, butter, beer and, in Mediterranean countries, wine, olive oil, 
fruit and vegetables. Probate inventories, dowries, and archaeological excavations 
indicate that consumption of cheap manufactures (cloth, crockery, wooden utensils) 
also increased siginicantly. The late Middle Ages were thus the ' golden age of the 
peasant and labourer' (Dyer 1989). 
Changes on the supply side, which led to both deeper and wider markets, have 
attracted less attention. Market deepening - an increase in the volume, number and 
quality of commodities exchanged on the market - was the effect of income 
redistribution9 and increased labour productivity, which raised the disposable income 
7 See Allen (1998), who argues that the roots of economic divergence between 
European countries go back to 1500. 
8 This view contrasts with Postan's model, according to which the shift in factor prices 
and bargaining power from land to labour after the Black Death caused peasants and 
labourers to decrease their work effort rather than increase consumption of marketed 
goods (postan 1973). This assumption also underlies Wallerstein's thesis that the only 
way out of the crisis was by opening up new external markets, and Brenner's argument 
that peasants would not wilfully engage in production for markets and had to be 
expropriated to get capitalism on its feet. Evidence for a backward bending supply 
curve of labour comes from two rather ambiguous sources. Firstly, although the 
number of religious holidays may have increased in some cities during the late 
fourteenth century, indicating an increase in work leisure, it is not clear how far such 
changes could be enforced both within and outside the cities. Secondly, the complaint 
by English landlords that wage-earners were unwilling to stay long in a job, which 
might also be taken as evidence of unwillingness to work, is more easily explained as 
due to a stronger bargaining position (penn & Dyer 1990). 
9 Given the highly skewed distribution of income in feudal society, even a small 
redistribution had significant consequences. Thus, if the feudal class (say 5 per cent of 
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of peasants and labourers, and of improvements in the operation of markets; market 
widening - an increase in the geographical size of markets - was a consequence of 
political centralisation and lower transaction costs. These structural supply-side 
changes induced by the . crisis' can be grouped under five headings. 
I . Market deepening entailed three distinct but related phenomena: first, an 
increase in per caput consumption of already commercialised goods with higher 
elasticity of demand; second, an increase in the proportion of total output that was 
traded through the market (increased 'commercialisation'); and third, an increase in the 
range of goods produced and traded on the market (product innovation). Evidence of 
increased commercialisation can be found in the growth across late medieval Europe of 
rural manufacture, particularly of cloth but also of crockery, glassware and pewter. 
Evidence of product invention and innovation is harder to come by and has attracted 
less attention. Examples include the mass diffusion of linen underwear (whose effects 
for public health should not be underestimated) (Reers 1976), the invention of 
transportable hard cheese (caciocavaUo and parmesan) in Italy (Epstein 1992), the 
development of herring and pilchard preservation in north-western Europe (de Vries & 
van der Woude 1997; Kowaleski 1998), the selection of higher quality wines identified 
by their place of origin (Melis 1984), and the widespread diffusion of plants of Islamic 
origin (indigo, rice, spinach, sugar, artichokes, probably eggplants) that had been little 
more than garden curiosities before the Black Death (Watson 1983). 
These phenomena were akin in structure though clearly not in extent to the . industrious 
revolution' of the seventeenth century, when labour inputs may have increased in 
response to a growing range of consumer goods (de Vries 1994). In a similar way, 
late medieval commercialisation could increase if the already employed (mainly adult 
males) worked longer or more productively thanks to greater specialisation and an 
improved nutritional status, or if previously unemployed or under-employed labour 
the popUlation) laid claim to 50 per cent of GNP before the Black Death (postan), a 
decline of that share to 40 per cent would raise per caput income by 20 per cent among 
the rest of the population. 
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was used for new, non grain-producing activities (Bridbury 1973). Regarding the latter, 
Goldberg and Poos have indeed argued that unmarried female employment rose after 
the Black Death, although most of their evidence comes from the urban trades or from 
services. Pending further research we can only speculate that the increase in rural 
manufacture referred to previously is likely to have required greater labour inputs by 
children and women (Goldberg 1992; Poos 1991 ; Knotter 1994). 
2. If the average per caput volume and value of trade increased, as the preceding 
argument implies, transactions costs at the margin would rise also, and more efficient 
systems of distribution would be required to capture the benefits of trade. Several 
institutional changes took place that aimed to lower transaction costs along such lines. 
Firstly, there was a sharp rise in the number of annual or seasonal fairs specialising to 
regional and inter-regional trade, particularly in livestock and livestock products but 
also in rural manufactures (Epstein 1994). TIlls development was probably associated 
with the emergence of a trans-regional network of petty traders based in and around the 
Alps (Fontaine 1996). 
Secondly, regional grain markets became more integrated (in Holland, England and 
Italy) and the price volatility of grain declined (Unger 1983; Poehlmann 1993; Epstein 
1998d). Market integration increased because jurisdictional integration within states 
lowered direct and indirect barriers to trade and gave rise to better co-ordinated 
systems of road maintenance. Political centralisation also helped reduce price 
volatility by weakening the traditionally autarkic supply policies of towns, which 
exacerbated price volatility by restricting compensatory trade flows across regions, by 
impeding the diffusion of accurate information about available stocks, and by 
upholding a policy of over-stocking by individual towns. In brief, the rise of larger, 
more powerful states helped overcome the market failures and prisoner's dilemmas 
associated with competition between protected food markets (Epstein 1998d). 
TIllrdly, localised demographic shocks stimulated more integrated regional and supra-
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regional labour markets. This process affected unskilled, particularly agricultural 
labour engaged in seasonal migration between highlands and lowlands (Viazzo 1989) 
and between lowland regions with different agrarian specialisms (Epstein 1998c), and 
it is likely that rural hiring fairs either emerged or developed further to co-ordinate 
these labour flows (Penn and Dyer 1990). However, the period also witnessed the rise 
in Europe of regional circuits of specialised craft-trained labour and the development 
of supra-local journeymen associations (Epstein 1998b; Reininghaus 1981). 
Changes in interest rates and in rates of urbanisation can be used to measure the degree 
of international economic convergence and the reductions in transaction costs that 
were taking place. On the one hand, the Europe-wide decline in the interest rates paid 
by the larger monarchies from c. 15-20 per cent before the Black Death to an average 
5-10 per cent in the sixteenth century (Italian city-states saw rates decline from 7 to 4 
per cent over the same period) points to substantial gains in market efficiency and to 
reduced commercial and institutional risk (Blanchard 1992; Epstein 1999). In 
England, expected rates of return to capital as measured by life annuities and perpetual 
rents also dropped from c.11 per cent around 1300 to 6 per cent around 1515-30 
(Keene & Harding 1983). On the other hand, urbanisation in the most developed pre-
plague economies like Flanders, Tuscany, Sicily and Catalonia stagnated or declined, 
but urbanisation in the less advanced regions (southern and north-western Italy, 
Castile, Holland, southern Germany and England) increased to the level of the 
economically more advanced (Epstein 1998a; StabeI1997). The cumulative effect was 
to increase the average European rate of urbanisation (de Vries 1984). In this case, the 
rising urban ratio arguably reflects efficiency gains in distribution rather than increased 
agricultural productivity: more people lived in towns because they could be supplied 
more easily with food, and thanks to more efficient labour markets, town dwellers 
could transfer more easily to the countryside during the seasonal peaks in demand for 
agriCUltural labour (Grantham 1993). 
3. Ceteris paribus, increased commercialisation should have stimulated Ricardian 
specialisation based on absolute and comparative advantage. A clear example of this 
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is the development after 1400 of a pan-European cattle trade (Blanchard 1986); similar 
albeit less far-flung networks developed around European trade in metals (copper, iron, 
tin and silver), salt and grain (Kellenbenz 1986). Nonetheless, pervasive fiscal , 
monetary, and cultural (linguistic) barriers to trade and factor mobility meant that 
specialisation occurred more easily within politically defined boundaries than across 
them. Those barriers were only partially weakened by access to cheap water transport: 
maritime regions like Holland and Sicily were highly unusual examples of strong 
overseas export-orientation (Blockmans 1993; Epstein 1992). This explains why, 
notwithstanding the rise of late medieval ' national' states in Castile, Burgundy, and 
France, the economic landscape in most of Renaissance Europe remained obstinately 
regional: differences between north Italian territorial states were probably less 
significant than those between politically unified Spanish or French regions. 
The development of more stable regional (and in the case of England, possibly proto-
national) urban hierarchies reflected both pressure for stronger regional integration and 
institutional constraints on inter-regional trade. Although urban hierarchies at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century appear strictly regional and 'medieval' from the 
vantage point of later developments (de Vries 1984), they were in actual fact the 
outcome of the late medieval crisis. Just as with the development of 'national' urban 
hierarchies in the seventeenth century, the rise of regional hierarchies during the late 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was a function of political centralisation, which 
weakened traditional urban economic prerogatives, reduced barriers to trade between 
towns, and established the first true capital cities (Chittolini 1987; Chevalier 1982). 
Sharper urban hierarchies emerged because urban competition increased and external 
economies of scale or of agglomeration could be exploited. Economies of scale can 
be observed, for example, in the tendency for more highly specialised industries like 
wool and silk cloth to concentrate in fewer urban centres and in the correlate trend for 
urban craft associations to become more specialised (Persson 1988). 
4. The strong growth of rural manufacture, particularly of textiles (linen, wool, 
fustian) after the mid-fourteenth century in Italy, Catalonia, Germany, Flanders, 
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England and France shows a striking similarity to seventeenth-century 'proto-
industrialisation' (Kellenbenz 1963). Hohenberg and Lees have explained the analogy 
in terms of changing patterns of demand driven by demographic pressures. Thus, 
contracting population and rising rural living standards in the fifteenth and late 
seventeenth centuries stimulated demand for proto-industrial products, while rising 
popUlation and declining living standards from the early sixteenth to the mid-
seventeenth century caused proto-industrial contraction (Hohenberg and Lees 1985). 
An explanation along the lines previously traced would put greater emphasis on 
changes in the supply structure. Given the strength of urban territorial jurisdictions in 
Europe, especially outside England, and of manorialism in late medieval England, 
south-west Germany and Catalonia, rural proto-industries required a form of ' infant 
industry protection' from urban craft monopolies (where such were dominant) and from 
manorial lords (where such prevailed). Both periods of proto-industrial expansion 
witnessed similar institutional changes that lowered barriers to entry for rural 
manufacture, through the attack by centralising states on parcellised jurisdictional 
prerogatives and the decline of manorialism and serfdom. Thus, the two waves of 
'proto-industrial' growth in the late Middle Ages and the seventeenth century 
coincided with the two most important phases of state centralisation in the pre-modern 
era, when traditional urban and feudal jurisdictions came under strong attack and the 
institutional framework for rural industry accordingly improved (Epstein 1993 and 
1998c).1O 
5. Finally, increased regional trade and labour market integration intensified 
technological diffusion, both because the rate of investment would have increased in 
response to rising demand and sharply lower interest rates and because technical 
knowledge was largely diffused through mobile skilled labour. It seems likely that 
during the late Middle Ages the new pattern of journeyman tramping intensified the 
diffusion of best practice and micro-improvements (Epstein 1998). For obvious 
10 Note that where urban powers were very extensive, feudal jurisdictions could act as 
protective barriers to urban encroachment, and vice versa. 
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reasons technical innovation through diffusion was achieved more quickly in 
manufacture and trade than in agriculture. Among the most important inventions and 
innovations were the three-masted carrack and the diffusion of carvel construction in 
ships (Unger 1980), the diffusion of the compass (Kreutz 1973), the ' cartographic 
revolution' that brought together the distinct traditions ofportulan charts, ' imaginary' 
world maps, and ' empirical' local and regional maps (Harvey 1991), the rediscovery of 
the astrolabe (Taylor 1957), the series of innovations leading to the invention of the 
blast furnace in the late fifteenth century, the creation of movable type as a result of 
technical cross-fertilisation between metallurgy, goldsmithing and engraving, and the 
invention of spring-driven clocks and watches, the Saxony wheel for spinning (Mokyr 
1990: 48-55), gunpowder, portable guns and movable cannon. However, agricultural 
innovation through diffusion is also testified, for example by the adoption in North 
Germany of agricultural technology from the Low Countries (Epstein 1998b; Hoffinan 
1996) and the previously mentioned diffusion ofIslamic crops. 
VI 
I have suggested that the late medieval crisis is best understood as an exogenous 
demographic shock which triggered a process of ' creative destruction' that lifted the 
west European economy to a higher growth path. On the demand side, income 
redistribution from landlords to peasants and wage earners increased demand for low-
value goods. Aggregate demand was also raised by increased state taxation to fund 
expansionary warfare (Ormrod 1995). On the supply side, the demographic shock 
accelerated processes of state centralisation inherent to the feudal-tributary mode of 
production. Centralisation lowered domestic transactions costs, intensified economic 
competition between towns and strengthened urban hierarchies, weakened urban 
monopolies over the countryside, and stimulated labour mobility and technological 
diffusion. However, the extent and depth of territorial integration was affected by the 
balance of power between the four main political forces in the field: central rulers, 
feudal lords, and urban and rural elites. Therein - in the political economy of markets 
- lies the key to differences in economic performance between early modern regions. 
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Although maritime trade and the overseas discoveries have often loomed large in 
explanations of the late medieval recovery, their effects appear all in all to be rather 
marginal. The European discoveries played virtually no role in bringing the 
demographic crisis to an end. Not only were there significant differences in the timing 
of the demographic recovery, ranging from Italy in the 1450s to England in the 1490s 
(evidence also of a lack of European integration around 1500), but the recovery mostly 
began several decades before the great maritime expansion. Moreover, the secular 
decline in interest rates before 1500 is evidence that capital was not scarce, as 
proponents of a fifteenth-century ' bullion famine' have suggested (Day 1978), and 
implies in addition that American bullion (which significantly affected metallic 
supplies only from the 1530s) was neither necessary nor sufficient to support Europe' s 
economic recovery. 
Similar comments apply to the effects of maritime trade within Europe. During the 
' crisis' long-distance maritime trade seems to have contracted relatively to trade 
overland or by sea within individual regions, and only began to pick up again 
significantly after the demographic recovery had begun. 11 The decline has been 
explained as a consequence of increasing levels of risk because of endemic warfare 
(van der Wee & Peters 1970; Munro 1991), but it was probably just as much a result of 
widespread import substitution at the hands of rural cloth industries, which forced 
established urban industries to specialise to higher value-added products that had 
narrower overseas markets. The relative buoyancy of mid-range shipping between 
1350 and 1450 was due to the development of larger transport ships and of insurance 
based on value rather than weight, which lowered transport costs for cheap agricultural 
goods (Unger 1980; Melis 1964). However, even these major technical developments 
cannot disguise the minuscule size of the maritime trade compared with trade overland 
in this period. To take the extreme case of fifteenth and sixteenth-century Sicily, 
11 TIlls was the significance of the debate between Lopez, Miskirnin and Cipolla (1964) on the 
late medieval 'crisis'. The former were concerned with long distance trade and were therefore 
more pessimistic; the latter observed rising shorter range trade and was therefore moderately 
optimistic. 
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which exported large quantities of grain, silk, sugar and many lesser agricultural 
products and had one of the most open economies of pre-modern Europe, foreign trade 
accounted for no more than 15 per cent of GNP (Epstein 1992). 
Finally, one may question Braudel and Wallerstein's opinion that merchant capitalism 
associated with long-distance trade and urban entrepots was an independent source of 
growth. The point can be illustrated with two late medieval examples, Tuscany and 
Holland. Before the Black Death, Tuscany had one of the most developed economies 
in Europe, which included a population density of 60 inhabitants/km2, a rate of 
urbanisation of cAD per cent, and an industrial, commercial and financial metropolis 
of more than 100'000 inhabitants. By comparison, Holland was an under-populated 
and under-urbanised backwater. By 1450, the economy of Tuscany was stagnating 
and Florence was slipping rapidly down the urban ranks, whereas Holland was being 
transformed into an advanced, highly urbanised and commercialised economy (Epstein 
1993; Blockmans 1993). 
As with Tuscany, the relative decline during the late Middle Ages of other advanced 
maritime economies like Catalonia and Flanders goes to show that easy access to 
maritime trade and well-established mercantile and industrial communities did not 
provide a permanent comparative advantage. Late medieval Holland successfully 
exploited the new opportunities provided by the . crisis' thanks to its weak seigniorial 
and urban power structures, which gave it great commercial flexibility, and to its 
position at the cross-roads of the North European overland and maritime trade and 
fishing industry. In Tuscany, by contrast, the Florentine elites deployed unrivalled 
political authority to divert rent streams from their subjects; despite the fact that the 
conquest of Pisa in 1406 gave Florence direct access to the sea for the first time, the 
regional economy never regained its medieval primacy. 
This comparison raises the broader question of the causes of economic divergence 
between pre-modern regions. The pessimistic answer is that the long-run stability in 
per caput cereal consumption everywhere in Europe outside England is proof that 
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economic stagnation was the norm, and that early modern England is the exception that 
proves the rule. The pessimists presume that pre-modern European economies outside 
England were fundamentally similar and imply that historical (political, social and 
institutional) differences had little effect on regional performance -leaving the English 
. exception' an unexplained mystery (van Zanden 1997). The more optimistic line 
pursued here is that measures of economic growth based strictly on cereal consumption 
underestimate per caput and GNP growth, for two reasons. First, the pessimistic case 
makes insufficient allowance for increased consumer utility through greater diversity 
and improved quality of food and because of the long-run decline in price volatility 
caused by market integration. Significant improvements to both sources of welfare 
can be traced back to the rise of more integrated markets during the later Middle Ages. 
Secondly, the pessimists' case ignores that pre-modern growth occurred for the most 
part in the manufacturing and service sectors rather than in cereal production, even 
though it will probably never be possible to measure these changes very accurately. 
The optimists therefore take evidence of some pre-modern growth to ask why there 
was not any more. They emphasise regional diversity and consider its causes a puzzle 
to be explained. While the preceding argument has dwelt mainly on the shared 
features of the late medieval crisis, it has also been shown how the political economy 
of the crisis could set regional market structures on divergent economic trajectories. 
The demographic shock set off social, economic and political struggles between 
sovereigns, feudal lords, cities and rural communities. The prevailing balance of class 
and group power, which varied across regions, determined the extent to which income 
was redistributed, domestic transactions costs were reduced, gains from specialisation 
could be claimed, low cost rural industries had room to develop, and the prices of food 
supplies could be stabilised. Although inter-regional trade and migration stimulated 
some regional economic convergence, domestic market structures played a more 
important role in defining economic performance in the long term. 
23 
Bibliography 
Abel, W. 1980. Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe. From the Thirteenth to the 
Twentieth Centuries, Eng.transl., London. 
Abrams, P. 1978. 'Towns and Economic Growth: Some Theories and Problems', in 
P.Abrams and E.A.Wrigley eds. Towns in Societies. Essays in Economic 
History and Historical Sociology, Cambridge, pp. 9-33. 
Alien, R. 1995. Enclosure and the Yeoman, Oxford. 
Bailey, M. 1998. 'Peasant Welfare in England, 1290-1348' , Economic History 
Review, 2nd ser. 51, pp. 223-51. 
Biller, P.P.A. 1980. 'Birth-Control in the West in the Thirteenth and Early 
Fourteenth Centuries', Past and Present, 94, pp.3-26. 
Blanchard,LS.W. 1986. 'The Continental European Cattle Trades, 1400-1600', 
Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 39, pp. 427-60. 
Blanchard. 1992. ' Introduction', in 1. Blanchard, A. Goodman and J. Newman eds. 
Industry and Finance in Early Modern History. Essays Presented to George 
Hammersley to the Occasion of His 74th Birthday, Stuttgart, pp.13-25. 
Blockmans, W. 1993. ' The Economic Expansion of Holland and Zeeland in the 
Fourteenth-Sixteenth Centuries', in E.Aerts, B.Henau, P.Janssens and R. van 
Uytven eds. Studia Historica Oeconomica. Liber Amicorum Herman Van der 
Wee , Leuven, pp.41-58. 
Bois, G. 1984. The Crisis of Feudalism: Economy and Society in Eastern 
Normandy, Engl.trans., Cambridge. 
Boserup, E. 1965. The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, London. 
Braude1, F. 1982. Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. New York. 
Brenner, R. 1985. 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism', in T.H.Aston and 
C.H.E.Philpin eds' The Brenner Debate. Agrarian Class Structure and 
Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, Cambridge, pp.213-327. 
Bridbury, A. 1973. 'The Black Death', Economic History Review 2nd ser. 26, 
pp.557-92. 
Britnell, R. 1993. The Commercialisation of English Society 1000-1350, Cambridge. 
Campbell, B.M.S. and M. Overton. 1993. 'A New Perspective on Medieval and 
Early Modem Agriculture: Six Centuries of Norfolk Farming c.1250-c.1850', 
Past and Present 141, pp.38-105. 
24 
Chevalier, B. 1982. Les bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVIe siec/e, Paris. 
Chittolini, G. 1987. 'La citta europea tra Medioevo e Rinascimento', in P.Rossi ed. 
Modelli di citta. Strutture e junzioni politiche, Turin, pp. 371-92. 
Cipolla C.M., R.S. Lopez and H.A. Miskimin. 1964. 'Economic depression of the 
Renaissance?', Economic History Review 2nd ser., 16, pp.519-29. 
Cotts Watkins, S. and J. Menken. 1985. 'Famines in Historical Perspective'. 
Population and Development Review 11 , pp.647-75. 
Day, 1. 1978. ' The Great Bullion Famine of the Fifteenth Century ', Past and Present, 
79, pp.3-54. 
Derville, A. 1987. 'Dimes, rendements du ble et "revolution agricole" dans le Nord 
de la France au moyen age', Annales ESC 42,6, pp.1411-32. 
Desai, M. 1991 . ' The Agrarian Crisis in Medieval England: A Malthusian Tragedy 
or a Failure of Entitlements?', Bulletin of Economic Research 43,3, pp.223-58. 
Dobb, M. 1946. Studies in the Development of Capitalism, London. 
Dyer, C. 1989. Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages. Social Change in 
England, c.1200-1520, Cambridge. 
Epstein, S.R. 1992. An Island for Itself. Economic Development and Social 
Transformation in Late Medieval Sicily, Cambridge. 
1993. 'Town and Country in Late Medieval Italy: Economic and Institutional 
Aspects', Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 46, pp. 453-77. 
1994. 'Regional Fairs, Institutional Innovation and Economic Growth in Late 
Medieval Europe', Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 47, pp. 459-82. 
1998a. 'Nuevas aproximaciones a la historia urbana de ltalia: el Renacirniento 
temprano', Hispania 58, 2, 417-38. 
1998b. ' Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship and Technological Change in Pre-
Modern Europe', The Journal of Economic History, 53, 3. 
1998c. ' Italy', in T.Scott ed. The Peasantries of Europe from the Fourteenth to 
the Eighteenth Century. London. 
1998d. ' Market Structures', in W.Connell and A.Zorzi eds. Florentine 
Tuscany: Structures and Practices of Power. Cambridge. 
1999. 'Constitutions, Liberties, and Growth in Pre-Modem Europe' , in 
P.Koslowski ed., Cultural Factors and Economic Growth, Munich-New York, 
1999. 
25 
Fogel, R. 1992. 'Second Thoughts on the European Escape from Hunger: Famines, 
Chronic Malnutrition, and Mortality', in S.R.Osmani ed. Nutrition and Poverty, 
Oxford, pp.243-86. 
Fontaine, L. 1996. History of Pedlars in Europe, Engl. transl. , Oxford. 
Goldberg, P.J.P. 1992. Women, Work, and Life Cycle in a Medieval Economy. 
Women in York and Yorkshire c.J300-J 520, Oxford. 
Grantham, G.W. 1993. 'Divisions of Labour: Agricultural Productivity and 
Occupational Specialization in Pre-Industrial France', Economic History Review 
2nd ser. 46, 3, pp.478-502. 
Grantham, G.W. 1997. 'Espaces priviJegies. Productivite agraire et zones 
d'approvisionnement des villes dans l'Europe preindustrielle', Annales HSS, 
(3), pp. 695-725. 
Harvey, B. F. 1991. ' Introduction: The ' Crisis' of the Early Fourteenth Century', in 
B.M.S.Campbell, ed. Before the Black Death. Studies in the 'Crisis' of the Early 
Fourteenth Century. Manchester, pp. 1-24. 
Harvey, P.D.A. 1991. Medieval Maps . Toronto. 
Heers,1. 1976. 'La mode et les marches des draps de laine: Genes et la montagne a 
la fill du Moyen Age', in M.Spallanzani ed. Produzione commercio e consumo 
dei panni di lana (nei secoli XII-XVIII), Florence, pp. 199-220. 
Herlihy, D. 1982. 'Demography', in J.R.Strayer ed. Dictionary of the Middle Ages, 
New York, iv, pp. 136-48. 
Hoffinan, P. 1996. Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450-
1815, Princeton. 
Hohenberg, P.M. and L.H.Lees. 1985. The Making of Urban Europe, 1000-1950, 
Cambridge, MA. and London. 
Hymer, S. and S.Resnick. 1969. 'A Model of an Agrarian Economy with 
Nonagricultura1 Activities', American Economic Review, 59, pp.493-506. 
Keene, D. and V.Harding. 1987. Historical Gazetteer of London before the Great 
Fire, 1. Cheapside. Cambridge. 
Kellenbenz, H. 1973. ' Industries rurales en Occident de la fin du Moyen Age au 
XVIIIe siecle', Annales E.S.C. 18: 832-82. 
1986. ' Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Europas 1350-1650', in W. Fischer et aI., 
eds. Handbuch der Europdischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, 3, Stuttgart 
(Klett-Cotta) 1986, pp. 1-386. 
26 
Knotter, A. 1994. 'Problems of the Family Economy: Peasant Economy, Domestic 
Production and Labour Markets in Pre-Industrial Europe', Economic and Social 
History in the Netherlands 6. 
Kreutz, B.M. 1973. ' Mediterranean Contributions to the Medieval Mariner's 
Compass' , Technology and Culture 14, pp. 367-83. 
Labrousse, E. 1933. Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au 
XVIIIe siecle, 2 vols. , Paris. 
Langdon, J. 1986. Horses, Oxen and Technological Innovation. The Use of Draught 
Animals in English Farmingfrom 1066-1500, Cambridge. 
Le Roy Ladurie, E. 1966. Les paysans de Languedoc, Paris. 
Leverotti, F. 1989. ' Dalla famiglia stretta alla famiglia larga. Linee di evoluzione e 
tendenze della farniglia rurale lucchese (secoli XIV-XV)', Studi storici, 30, pp. 
171-202. 
Livi Bacci, M. 1990. Population and Nutrition. An Essay on European 
Demographic History, Eng!. trans!. of 2nd Italian ed., Cambridge. 
Melis, F. 1984. I vini italiani nel Medioevo, ed.A.Affortunati Parrini, Florence. 
1964. 'Wemer Sombart e i problemi della navigazione nel Medio Evo', in 
G.Barbieri et al. L'opera di Werner Sombart nel centenario della nascita, 
Milan, pp.85-149. 
Miller, E. and 1.Hatcher. 1995. Medieval England. Towns, Commerce and Crafts 
1086-1348, London and New York. 
Mokyr, J. 1990. The Lever of Riches. Technological Creativity and Economic 
Progress, Oxford and New York. 
Munro, J.H. 1991. 'Industrial Transformations in the North-West European Textile 
Trades, c.1290-c.1340: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis?' , in 
B.M.S.Campbell, ed. Before the Black Death. Studies in the 'Crisis' of the Early 
Fourteenth Century. Manchester, pp.l1 0-48. 
Nielsen, R. 1997. 'Storage and English Government Intervention in Early Modem 
Grain Markets', Journal of Economic History 57, I, pp.I-33. 
Olson, M. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation, 
and Social Rigidities. New Haven and London. 
Orrnrod, M. 'The West European Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages', in R.Bonney 
ed. Economic Systems and State Finance, Oxford 1995, pp. 123-60. 
Overton, M. Agricultural Revolution in England. The Transformation of the Agrarian 
27 
Economy 1500-1850, Cambridge 1996. 
Persson, K.G. 1988. Pre-Industrial Economic Growth. Social Organization and 
Technological Progress in Europe, Oxford. 
1991. 'Labour Productivity in Medieval Agriculture: Tuscany and the "Low 
Countries"', in B.M.S. Campbell and M. Overton eds. Land, Labour and 
Livestock Historical Studies in European Agricultural Productivity, 
Manchester, pp.124-43. 
1996. 'The Seven Lean Years, Elasticity Traps, and Intervention in Grain Markets 
in Pre-Industrial Europe', Economic History Review 49, pp.692-714 
Poehlrnann, E. 1993. Economic Growth in Late Medieval England: A Challenge to 
the Orthodoxy of Decline. M.Sc. Dissertation, London School of Economics. 
Poos, L. 1991. A Rural Society after the Black Death. Essex 1350-1525, Cambridge. 
Postan, M.M. 1973. Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the 
Medieval Economy, Cambridge. 
Postan, M.M. and J.Z. Titow (with statistical notes by J.Longden). 1958-9. ' Heriots 
and Prices on Winchester Manors', Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 11, 
pp.392-417. 
Ravallion, M. 1987. Markets and Famines, Oxford. 
Razi, Z. 1980. Life, Marriage and Death in a Medieval Parish: Economy, Society 
and Demography in Halesowen, 1270-1400, Cambridge. 
Reininghaus W. 1981. 'Die Migration der Handwerkgesellen in der Zeit der 
Entstehung ihrer Gilden (14.115. Jahrhundert)', Vierteljahrschriftfor Sozial-
und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 68, pp. 1-21. 
Sen, A. 1981. Poverty and Famines. An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, 
Oxford. 
Smith, R.M. 1991. 'Demographic Developments in Rural England, 1300-48: A 
Survey', in B.M.S.Campbell, ed. Before the Black Death. Studies in the 'Crisis' 
of the Early Fourteenth Century. Manchester, pp.25-78. 
Stabel, P. 1997. Dwarfamong Giants. The Flemish Urban Network in the Late 
Middle Ages, Leuven and Apeldoorn. 
Taylor, E.G.R. 1957. The Haven-Finding Art. A History of Navigation from 
Odysseus to Captain Cook. New York. 
Thoen, E. 
Unger, R.W. 1980. The Ship in the Medieval Economy 600-1600, London. 
28 
1983. 'Integration of Baltic and Low Countries Grain Markets, 1400-1800', in 
J.M. von Winter ed. The Interactions of Amsterdam and Antwerp with the Baltic 
Region, 1400-1800, Leiden, pp.I-IO. 
van der Wee H. and T.Peeters. 1970. 'Un modele dynamique de croissance 
interseculaire du commerce mondial (XIe-XVlle siecles)', Annales: E.S.C. 25, 
pp. 100-26. 
van Zanden, J.L. 1997. ' Pre-Modem Economic Growth: The European Economy 
1500-1800', Paper presented at the 4eme Joumees Braudelienne, NIAS 23-24 
May. 
Viazzo, P.P. 1989. Upland Communities. Environment, Population and Social 
Structure in the Alps Since the Sixteenth Century, Cambridge. 
de Vries, J. 1974. The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age 1500-/ 700, New 
Haven and London. 
1984. European Urbanization 1500-1800, London. 
1994. 'The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution', Journal of 
Economic History 54, 2, pp.249-70. 
de Vries, J. and A.W. van der Woude. 1997. The First Modern Economy. Success, 
Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815, Cambridge. 
Wallerstein,1. 1974. The Modern World-System, vol.l, New York. 
Waiter, J. and R.Schofield. 1989. 'Famine, Disease and Crisis Mortality in Early 
Modem Society', in J.Walter and R.Schofield, eds., Famine, Disease and the 
Social Order in Early Modern Society, Cambridge, pp.I-74. 
Watson, A. 1983. Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World. The Diffusion of 
Crops and Farming Techniques, 700-110. Cambridge. 
29 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
ECONOMIC mSTORY DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS 
1992 
1. Competing Notions of "Competition" in Late-Nineteenth Century American 
Economics 
Mary S. Morgan 
2. New Light Through Old Windows: A New Perspective on the British 
Economy in the Second World War 
Peter Howlett 
3. Social Risk and Social Welfare in Britain, 1870-1939 
Paullohnson 
4. Textile Factories , Tuberculosis and the Quality of Life in Industrializing 
Japan 
lanet Hunter 
5. European Emigration 1815-1930. Looking at the Emigration Decision Again 
Dudley Baines 
6. Scale Bias & State Building: an Historical Perspective on Government 
Intervention, Political Systems & Economic Performance in Tropical Africa 
Gareth Austin 
7. Class Law in Victorian England 
Paullohnson 
8. The Instituto Nacional de Prevision Social and Social Insurance Reform in 
Argentina, 1944 to 1953 
Peter Lloyd-Sherlock 
9. Human Capital and Payment Systems in Britain, 1833-1914 
Dudley Baines, Peter Howlett, Paul lohnson 
10. Much Ado About Little 
Robert Humphreys 
11. Regional Fairs , Institutional Innovation and Economic Growth in Late 
Medieval Europe 
S.R. Epstein 
1993 
12. The Performance of Public Enterprises in South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe during the last two decades 
David Ferreira 
13. Political Primacy in Economic Laws : A Comparison of British and American 
Anti-dumping Legislation, 1921 
Peter M. Richards 
14. Scientific Charity in Victorian London. Claims and Achievements of the 
Charity Organisation Society, 1869-1890 
Robert Humphreys 
15. Essex Men Vindicated: Output, Incomes and Investment in Agriculture, 
1850-73 
E.H. Hunt and S.J. Pam 
1994 
16. Learning by Doing among Victorian Farmworkers: A case study in the 
Biological and Cognitive Foundations of Skill Acquisition 
David Mitch 
17. "Blind Alley" Employment and the Role of Adolescent Labor Force 
Experience in Skill Development in Late 19th and Early 20th Century 
England 
David Mitch 
18. British Imperialism in Microcosm: The Annexation of the Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands 
Margaret Ackrill 
19. Short-termism on Trial : An Empirical Approach 
Breht Feigh 
20. Tenancy and Agricultural Techniques: Evidence from the 1882 Commission 
David Coombs 
21. Economic Distress and Unemployment in Australia since 1850 
Paul lohnson 
22. Freedom and Growth. The European Miracle? 
S.R. Epstein 
23 . Bygone Charity - Myths and Realities 
Robert Humphreys 
24. Late Economic Development in a Regional Context 
Domingos Giroieni, Max-Stephan Schuize, Caries Sudriii 
1995 
25 . How Important was Tariff Protection for Spanish Farming prior to 1936? 
lames Simpson 
26. British Business in Argentina 
Coiin M. Lewis 
27. The Principal-Agent Question: the Chartered Trading Companies 
S.P. Vilie and S.R.H. lanes 
28 . Craft Guilds , Apprenticeship and Technological Change in Pre-Modern 
Europe 
S.R. Epstein 
29. The ' Quality of Life': Lessons for and from the British Industrial Revolution 
N.F.R. Crafts 
1996 
30. Transplanting Economic Ideas: International Coercion and Native Policy 
loanna Pepeiasis Minogiou 
31. Creditors , Debtors and the Law in Victorian and Edwardian England 
Pauilohnson 
32. Population Growth and the Dynamics of Canadian Development: A 
Multivariate Time Series Approach 
Alan G. Green and Gordon R. Sparks 
33 . The Human Development Index: Some Historical Comparisons 
N.F.R. Crafts 
34. The Character of "Rational Economic Man" 
Mary S. Morgan 
1997 
35. Were British "Business Cycles" Cyclical? Evidence from Historical 
Statistics, 1700-1913 
Philip Epstein 
36. Re-Estimating Austrian GDP, 1870-1913: Methods and Sources 
Max-Stephan Schulze 
37. The labour force participation and economic well-being of older men in 
London, 1929-31 
Dudley Baines and Paul lohnson 
38. ' Pawns will live when slaves is apt to dye': Credit, Slaving and Pawnship at 
Old Calabar in the era of the Slave Trade 
Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson 
1998 
39. The Abolition of Resale Price Maintenance in Britain' in 1964: a turning point 
for British Manufacturers? 
Belen Mercer 
40, American Business Cycles since World War II : Historical Behaviour and 
Statistical Representation 
Philip Epstein 
41. Finance Capital in the Weimar Republic : Does evidence on supervisory board 
representation support Hilferding's view of the role of large banks in German 
capitalism? 
l eroen F. De Boer 
42 . Productivity Growth during the First Industrial Revolution: Inferences from 
the Pattern of British External Trade 
C. Knick Barley and N.F.R. Crafts 
43 . Clogs to Clogs in Three Generations? Explaining Entrepreneurial 
Performance in Britain since 1850 
Tom Nicholas 
44. Industrial Growth in the Third World , c.1870-c.1990: Depressions, Intra-
Regional Trade, and Ethnic Networks 
Edited by Gareth Austin 
45 . In search of the ' traditional' working class : social mobility and occupational 
continuity in inter-war London 
Dudley Baines and Paul lohnson 
46 . The late medieval crisis as an 'integration crisis ' 
S.R. Epstein 
1999 
47 . The Impact of American Aid in the Spanish Economy in the 1950s 
Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez 
48. Quantitative Economic History 
N.F.R. Crafts 
49. Nutrition and Economic Destitution in Northern Ghana , 1930-1957 . A Historical 
Perspective on Nutritional Economics . 
Jerome Destombes 


